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Abstract— The recent proliferation of computing technologies,
e.g., sensors, computer vision, machine learning, hardware ac-
celeration, and the broad deployment of communication mech-
anisms, e.g., DSRC, C-V2X, 5G, have pushed the horizon of
autonomous driving, which automates the decision and control
of vehicles by leveraging the perception results based on multiple
sensors. The key to the success of these autonomous systems
is making a reliable decision in a real-time fashion. However,
accidents and fatalities caused by early deployed autonomous
vehicles arise from time to time. The real traffic environment is
too complicated for the current autonomous driving computing
systems to understand and handle. In this paper, we present
the state-of-the-art computing systems for autonomous driving,
including seven performance metrics and nine key technologies,
followed by eleven challenges and opportunities to realize au-
tonomous driving. We hope this paper will gain attention from
both the computing and automotive communities and inspire
more research in this direction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, with the vast improvements in computing tech-
nologies, e.g., sensors, computer vision, machine learning,
hardware acceleration, and the wide deployment of commu-
nication mechanisms, e.g., Dedicated short-range communi-
cations (DSRC), Cellular V2X (C-V2X), 5G, autonomous
driving techniques have attracted massive attention from both
the academic and automotive communities. According to [1],
the Global autonomous driving market expects to grow up
to $173.15B by 2030. Many auto companies have made an
enormous investment in this domain, including Waymo, GM
Cruise, Argo AI, Tesla, Baidu, Uber, etc. Several fleets of the
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Autonomy Level 4
vehicles in the United States and China [2], [3].
To achieve autonomous driving, how to make the vehicle un-
derstand the environment correctly and make safe controls in
real-time is the essential task. Rich sensors including camera,
LiDAR, Radar, Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), Global Nav-
igation Satellite System (GNSS), and Sonar, as well as power-
ful computation devices, are installed on the vehicle [4], [5],
[6], [7], [8]. This design makes the autonomous driving a real
powerful ”computer on the wheel.” In addition to hardware, the
rapid development of deep learning algorithms in object/lane
detection, simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM),
and vehicle control also promotes the real deployment and
prototyping of the autonomous vehicles [9], [10], [11], [12].
The autonomous vehicles’ computing systems are defined to
cover everything, excluding the vehicle’s mechanical parts, in-
cluding sensors, computation, communication, storage, power
management, and full-stack of software. Plenty of algorithms
and systems are designed to process sensor data and make a
reliable decision in real-time.
However, news of fatalities caused by early developed
autonomous vehicles (AVs) arises from time to time. Until
August 2020, five self-driving car fatalities happened for level-
2 autonomous driving: four of them from Tesla while one
from Uber [13]. Table I summarizes the date, place, company,
and reasons for these five fatalities. The first two fatalities of
Tesla happened in 2016 because neither the Autopilot system
nor the driver failed to the truck under thick haze or mistook
the truck as for open space. Another incident from Tesla in
2018 is that the Autopilot fails to recognize the higher divider
and crushed. The recent fatality from Tesla happens in 2019
because it failed to recognize a semitrailer. The fatality from
Uber happens because the autonomous driving system fails to
recognize that pedestrians jaywalk.
In summary, all four incidents from Tesla are due to per-
ception failure, while Uber’s incident happens because of the
failure to predict human behavior. Another fact to pay attention
to is that currently, the field-testing of level-2 autonomous
driving vehicles mostly happen in places with good weather
and light conditions like Arizona and Florida. The real traffic
environment is too complicated for the current autonomous
driving systems to understand and handle. The objectives of
level-4 and level-5 autonomous driving require colossal im-
provement of the computing systems for autonomous vehicles.
This paper presents the state-of-the-art computing systems
for autonomous driving, including seven performance metrics
and nine key technologies, followed by eleven challenges and
opportunities to realize autonomous driving. The remaining
parts of this paper organized as follows. Section II discusses
the reference architecture of the computing systems for au-
tonomous driving. In Section III, we show some metrics used
in the evaluation of the computing system. Section IV dis-
cusses the key technologies for autonomous driving. Section V
presents the possible challenges and opportunities. Finally, this
paper concludes in Section VI.
II. REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE
As an essential part of the whole autonomous driving
vehicle, the computing system plays a significant role in
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2TABLE I
LIST OF FATALITIES CAUSED BY LEVEL-2 AUTONOMOUS DRIVING VEHICLES
Date Place Company Reason
20 Jan. 2016 Handan, Hebei China Tesla fail to recognize truck under a thick haze
07 May 2016 Williston, Florida USA Tesla mistook the truck for open sky
18 Mar. 2018 Tempe, Arizona USA Uber fail to recognize pedestrians jaywalk at night
23 Mar. 2018 Mountain View, California USA Tesla fail to recognize the highway divider
1 Mar. 2019 Delray Beach, Florida USA Tesla fail to recognize semitrailer
the whole pipeline of driving autonomously. There are two
types of designs for computing systems on autonomous ve-
hicles: modular-based and end-to-end based. Modular design
decouples the localization, perception, control, etc. as sepa-
rate modules and make it possible for people with different
background work together [14], [15], [16], [17], [18]. End-to-
end based design is largely motivated by the development of
artificial intelligence. Compared with modular design, end-to-
end system purely relies on machine learning techniques to
process the sensor data and generate control commands to the
vehicle [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24]. Although the end-to-
end based approach promises to decrease the modular design’s
error propagation and computation complexity, there is no real
deployment and testing of it [25]. As most prototypes are still
modular-based, we choose it as the basis of the computing
system reference architecture. Figure 1 shows a representative
reference architecture of the computing system on autonomous
vehicles. Generally, the computing system for autonomous
driving vehicles can be divided into computation, communi-
cation, storage, security and privacy, and power management.
Each part covers four layers with sensors, operating system
(OS), middleware, and applications. The following paragraphs
will discuss the corresponding components.
For safely, one of the essential tasks is to enable the “com-
puter” to understand the road environment and send correct
control messages to the vehicle. The whole pipeline starts with
the sensors. Plenty of sensors can be found on an autonomous
driving vehicle: camera, LiDAR, radar, GPS/GNSS, ultrasonic,
inertial measurement unit (IMU), etc. These sensors capture
real-time environment information for the computing system,
like the eyes of human beings. Operating system (OS) plays
a vital role between hardware devices (sensors, computation,
communication) and applications. Within the OS, drivers are
bridges between the software to hardware devices; the network
module provides the abstraction communication interface; the
scheduler manages the competition to all the resources; the file
system provides the abstraction to all the resources. For safety-
critical scenarios, the operating system must satisfy real-time
requirements.
As the middle layer between applications and operating sys-
tems [26], middleware provides usability and programmability
to develop and improve systems more effectively. Generally,
middleware supports publish/subscriber, remote procedure call
(RPC) or service, time synchronization, and multi-sensor col-
laboration. A typical example of the middleware system is the
Robot Operating System (ROS) [27]. On top of the operating
system and middleware system, several applications, including
object/lane detection, SLAM, prediction, planning, and vehicle
control, are implemented to generate control commands and
send them to the vehicle’s drive-by-wire system. Inside the
vehicle, several Electronic Control Units (ECUs) are used to
control the brake, steering, etc., which are connected via Con-
troller Area Network (CAN bus). In addition to processing the
data from on-board sensors, the autonomous driving vehicle
is also supposed to communicate with other vehicles, traffic
infrastructures, pedestrians, etc. as complementary.
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Fig. 1. Representative reference architecture of the computing system for
autonomous driving.
III. METRICS FOR COMPUTING SYSTEM
According to the report about autonomous driving tech-
nology from the National Science & Technology Council
(NSTC) and the United States Department of Transportation
(USDOT) [28], ten technology principles are designed to
foster research, development, and integration of AVs and guide
consistent policy across the U.S. Government. These principles
cover safety, security, cybersecurity, privacy, data security,
mobility, accessibility, etc. Corresponding to the autonomous
driving principles, we define several metrics to evaluate the
computing system’s effectiveness.
Accuracy Accuracy is defined to evaluate the difference
between the detected/processed results with the ground truth.
Take object detection and lane detection, for example, the
Intersection Over Union (IOU) and mean Average Precision
(mAP) are used to calculate the exact difference between
the detected bounding box of objects/lanes and the real po-
sitions [29], [30]. For vehicle controls, the accuracy would be
the difference between the expected controls in break/steering
with the vehicle’s real controls.
Timeliness Safety is always the highest priority. Au-
tonomous driving vehicles should be able to control them-
selves autonomously in real-time. According to [31], if the
vehicle is self-driving at 40km per hour in an urban area
3and wants the control effective every 1 meter, then the whole
pipeline’s desired response time should be less than 90ms. To
satisfy the desired response time, we need each module in the
computing system to finish before the deadline.
Power Since the on-board battery power the whole com-
puting system, the computing system’s power dissipation can
be a big issue. For electrical vehicles, the computing system’s
power dissipation for autonomous driving reduces the vehicle’s
mileage with up to 30% [32]. In addition to mileage, heat dissi-
pation is another issue caused by high power usage. Currently,
the NVIDIA Drive PX Pegasus provides 320 INT8 TOPS of
AI computational power with a 500 Watts budget [33]. With
the power budget of sensors, communication devices, etc.,
the total power dissipation will be higher than 1000 Watts.
The power budget is supposed to be a significant obstacle for
producing the real autonomous driving vehicle.
Cost Cost is one of the essential factors that affect the
board deployment of autonomous vehicles. According to [34],
[35], the cost of a level 4 autonomous driving vehicle attains
300,000 dollars, in which the sensors, computing device,
and communication device cost almost 200,000 dollars. In
addition to the hardware cost, the operator training, vehicle
maintenance cost of AVs like insurance, parking, and repair
are also more expensive than traditional vehicles.
Reliability To guarantee the safety of the vehicle, reli-
ability is a big concern. On the one hand, the worst-case
execution time is supposed to be longer than the dead-
line. Interruptions or emergence stops should be applied in
such cases. On the other hand, failures happen in sensors,
computing/communication devices, algorithms, and systems
integration. How to handle these potential failures is also an
essential part of the design of the computing system.
Privacy As the vehicle captures a massive amount of sensor
data from the environment, vehicle data privacy becomes a big
issue. For example, the pedestrian’s face and the license plate
captured by the vehicle’s camera should be masked as soon as
possible. Furthermore, who owns the driving data is also an
important issue, which requires the system’s support for data
access, storage, and communication.
Security How secure the on-board computing system is es-
sential to the success of autonomous driving since, ultimately,
the computing system is responsible for the driving process.
Cyber attacks can be launched quickly to any part of the
computing system. We divide the security into four aspects:
sensing security, communication security, data security, and
control security. We envision that the on-board computing
system will have to pass a certain security test level before
deploying it into real products.
IV. KEY TECHNOLOGIES
An autonomous vehicle involves multiple subjects, includ-
ing computing systems, machine learning, communication,
robotics, mechanical engineering, and systems engineering,
to integrate different technologies and innovations. Figure 2
shows a typical example of autonomous driving vehicles
called Hydra, which is developed by The CAR lab at Wayne
State University [36]. An NVIDIA Drive PX2 is used as the
steering
throttle
shifting
brake
Vehicle CAN bus
drive-by-wire system
NVIDIA Drive PX2
cameras radars
DSRC GNSS LiDAR
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Fig. 2. A typical example of a computing system for autonomous driving.
vehicle computation unit (VCU). Multiple sensors, including
six cameras, six radars, one LiDAR, one GNSS antenna, and
one DSRC antenna, are installed for sensing and connected
with VCU. The CAN bus is used to transmitting messages
between different ECUs controlling steering, throttle, shifting,
brake, etc. Between the NVIDIA Drive PX2 and the vehicle’s
CAN bus, a drive-by-wire system is deployed as an actuator
of the vehicle control commands from the computing system.
Besides, a power distribution system is used to provide extra
power for the computing system. It is worth noting that the
computing system’s power distribution is non-negligible in
modern AVs [37]. In this section, we summarize several key
technologies and discuss their state-of-the-art.
A. Sensors
1) Cameras: In terms of usability and cost, cameras are
the most popular sensors on autonomous driving vehicles. The
camera image gives straightforward 2D information, making
it useful in some tasks like object classification and lane
tracking. Besides, the range of the camera can vary from
several centimeters to near one hundred meters. The relatively
low cost and commercialization production also contribute
to the complete deployment in the real autonomous driving
vehicle. However, based on lights, the camera’s image can
be affected by low lighting or bad weather conditions. The
usability of the camera decreases significantly under heavy
fog, raining, and snowing. Besides, the data from the camera
is also a big problem. On average, every second, one camera
can produce 20-40MB of data.
2) Radar: The radar’s full name is Radio Detection and
Ranging, which means to detect and get the distance using
radio. The radar technique measures the Time of Flight (TOF)
and calculates the distance and speed. Generally, the working
frequency of the vehicle radar system is 24GHz or 77GHz.
Compared with 24GHz, 77GHz shows higher accuracy in
distance and speed detection. Besides, 77GHz has a smaller
antenna size, and it has less interference than 24GHz. For
24GHz radar, the maximum detection range is 70 meters,
while the maximum range increases to 200 meters for 77GHz
radar. According to [4], the price for Continental’s long-range
Radar can be around $3000, which is higher than the camera’s
price. However, compared with a camera, radar is less affected
4by the weather and low lighting environment, making it very
useful in some applications like object detection and distance
estimation. The data size is also smaller than the camera. Each
radar produces 10-100KB per second.
3) LiDAR: Similar to Radar, LiDAR’s distance informa-
tion is also calculated based on the TOF. The difference is
that LiDAR uses the laser for scanning, while radar uses
electromagnetic waves. LiDAR consists of a laser generator
and a high accuracy laser receiver. LiDAR generates a three-
dimensional image of the objects, so it is widely used to
detect static objects and moving objects. LiDAR shows good
performance with a range from several centimeters to 200
meters, and the accuracy of distance goes to centimeter-
level. LiDAR is widely used in object detection, distance
estimation, edge detection, Simultaneously Localization and
Mapping (SLAM) [38], [11], and High-Definition (HD) Map
generation [39], [40], [41], [12]. However, in terms of the cost,
LiDAR seems less competitive with other sensors. According
to [5], the 16 lines Velodyne LiDAR costs almost $8000,
while the Velodyne VLS-128E costs over $100,000. High
costs restrict the wide deployment of LiDAR on autonomous
vehicles, contributing to the autonomous vehicle’s high cost.
LiDAR can generate almost 10-70MB data per second, a huge
amount of data for the computing platform to process in real-
time.
4) Ultrasonic sensor: Ultrasonic sensor is based on ul-
trasound to detect the distance. Ultrasound is a particular
sound that has a frequency higher than 20kHz. The distance is
also detected by measuring TOF. The ultrasonic sensor’s data
size is close to the radar’s, which is 10-100KB per second.
Besides, the ultrasonic sensor shows good performance in bad
weather and low lighting environment. The ultrasonic sensor
is much cheaper than the camera and radar. The price of the
ultrasonic sensor is always less than $100. The shortcoming of
ultrasonic is the maximum range of only 20 meters, limiting
its application to short-range detection like parking assistance.
5) GPS/GNSS/IMU: Except for sensing and perception of
the surrounding environment, localization is also a significant
task running on top of the autonomous driving system. In the
localization system of the autonomous vehicle, Global Position
System (GPS), Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS),
and Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) are widely deployed.
GNSS is the name for all the satellite navigation systems,
including GPS developed by the US, Galileo from Europe, and
BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) [6] from China.
The accuracy of GPS can vary from several centimeters to
several meters when different observation values and different
processing algorithms are applied [7]. The strength of GPS
is the cost is low, and the error is not accumulated with
time. The drawback of GPS is that the GPS deployed on
current vehicles only has accuracy in one meter, and GPS
requires an unobstructed view in the sky, so it doesn’t work
in an environment like tunnels. Besides, the GPS sensing data
updates every 100ms, which is not enough for the vehicle’s
real-time localization.
IMU represents for inertial measurement unit, which con-
sists of gyroscopes and accelerometers. Gyroscopes are used to
measure the axes’ angular speed to calculate the carrier’s po-
sition. In comparison, the accelerometer measures the object’s
three axes’ linear acceleration and can be used to calculate
the carrier’s speed and position. The strength of IMU is
that it doesn’t require an unobstructed view from the sky.
The drawback is that the accuracy is low, and the error is
accumulated with time. IMU can be a complimentary sensor
to the GPS because it has an updated value every 5ms, and it
works appropriately in the environment like tunnels. Usually,
a Kalman filter is applied to combine the sensing data from
GPS and IMU to get fast and accurate localization results [8].
Table II shows a comparison of sensors, including camera,
radar, LiDAR, and ultrasonic sensors with human beings. From
the comparison, we can easily conclude that although humans
have strength in the sensing range and show more advantaged
application scenarios than any sensor, the combination of all
the sensors can do a better job than human beings, especially
in bad weather and low lighting conditions.
B. Data Source
1) Data characteristics: As we listed before, various sen-
sors, such as GPS, IMU, camera, LiDAR, radar, are equipped
in AVs, and they will generate hundreds of megabytes of data
per second, fed to different autonomous driving algorithms.
The data in AVs could be classified into two categories,
real-time data, and historical data. Typically, the former is
transmitted by a messaging system with the Pub/Sub pattern in
most AVs solutions, enabling different applications to access
one data simultaneously. Historical data includes application
data. The data persisted from real-time data, where structured
data, i.e., GPS, is stored into a database, and unstructured data,
i.e., video, is stored as files.
2) Dataset and Benchmark: Autonomous driving dataset is
collected by survey fleet vehicles driving on the road, which
provides the training data for research in machine learning,
computer vision, and vehicle control. Several popular datasets
provide benchmarks, which are pretty useful in autonomous
driving systems and algorithms design. Here are a few popular
datasets: (1) KITTI: As one of the most famous autonomous
driving dataset, the KITTI [42] dataset covers stereo, optical
flow, visual odometry, 3D object detection, and 3D tracking.
It provides several benchmarks, such as stereo, flow, scene,
optical flow, depth, odometry, object tracking [43], road, and
semantics [44]. (2) Cityscapes: For the semantic understanding
of urban street scenes, the Cityscapes [45] dataset includes
2D semantic segmentation on pixel-level, instance-level, and
panoptic semantic labeling, and provides corresponding bench-
marks on them. (3) BDD100K: As a large-scale and diverse
driving video database, BDD100K [46] consists of 100,000
videos and covers different weather conditions and times of the
day. (4) DDD17: As the first end-to-end dynamic and active-
pixel vision sensors (DAVIS) driving dataset, DDD17 [47]
has more than 12 hours of DAVIS sensor data under different
scenarios and different weather conditions, as well as vehicle
control information like steering, throttle, and brake.
3) Labeling: Data labeling is an essential step in a super-
vised machine learning task, and the quality of the training
data determines the quality of the model. Here are a few dif-
ferent types of annotations methods: (1) Bounding boxes: the
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COMPARISONS OF CAMERA, RADAR, LIDAR, AND ULTRASONIC SENSOR.
Metrics Human Camera Radar LiDAR Ultrasonic
Techniques - Lights Electromagnetic Laser Reflection Ultrasound
Sensing Range 0-200m 0-100m 1cm-200m (77GHz)1cm-70m (24GHz) 0.7-200m 0-20m
Cost - ∼$500 ∼$3000 ∼5000−100,000 ∼$100
Data per second - ∼20-40MB 10-100KB ∼10-70MB 10-100KB
Bad weather
functionality Fair Poor Good Fair Good
Low lighting
functionality Poor Fair Good Good Good
Application
Scenarios
Object Detection
Object Classification
Edge Detection
Lane Tracking
Object Classification
Edge Detection
Lane Tracking
Object Detection
Distance Estimation
Object Detection
Distance Estimation
Edge Detection
Object Detection
Distance Estimation
most commonly used annotation method (rectangular boxes) in
object detection tasks to define the location of the target object,
which can be determined by the x and y-axis coordinates in the
upper-left corner and the lower-right corner of the rectangle.
(2) Polygonal segmentation: since objects are not always
rectangular, polygonal segmentation is another annotation ap-
proach where complex polygons are used to define the object’s
shape and location in a much precise way. (3) Semantic
segmentation: a pixel-wise annotation, where every pixel in
an image is assigned to a class. It is primarily used in cases
where environmental context is essential. (4) 3D cuboids: They
provide 3D representations of the objects, allowing models to
distinguish features like volume and position in a 3D space.
(5) Key-Point and Landmark are used to detect small objects
and shape variations by creating dots across the image. As to
the annotation software, MakeSense.AI [48], LabelImg [49],
VGG image annotator [50], LabelMe [51], Scalable [52], and
RectLabel [53] are the popular image annotation tools.
C. Algorithms
Plenty of algorithms are deployed in the computing system
for sensing, perception, localization, prediction, and control. In
this part, we present the state-of-the-art works for algorithms
including object detection, lane detection, localization and
mapping, prediction and planning, and vehicle control.
1) Object detection: Accurate object detection under chal-
lenging scenarios is essential for real-world deep learning
applications for AVs [54]. In general, it is widely accepted
that the development of object detection algorithms has gone
through two typical phases: (1) conventional object detec-
tion phase, and (2) deep learning supported object detection
phase [55]. Viola Jones Detectors [56], Histogram of Oriented
Gradients (HOG) feature descriptor [57], and Deformable
Part-based Model (DPM) [58] are all the typical traditional
object detection algorithms. Although todays most advanced
approaches have far exceeded the accuracy of traditional
methods, many dominant algorithms are still deeply affected
by their valuable insights, such as hybrid models, bounding
box regression, etc. As to the deep learning-based object
detection approaches, the state-of-the-art methods include the
Regions with CNN features (RCNN) series [59], [60], [30],
[61], Single Shot MultiBox Detector (SSD) series [62], [63],
and You Only Look Once (YOLO) series [64], [65], [9].
Girshick et al. first introduce deep learning into the object
detection field by proposing RCNN in 2014 [30], [66]. Later
on, Fast RCNN [59] and Faster RCNN [60] were developed
to accelerate detection speed. In 2015, the first one-stage
object detector, i.e., YOLO was proposed [64]. Since then,
the YOLO series algorithms have been continuously proposed
and improved, for example, YOLOv3 [9] is one of the most
popular approaches, and YOLOv4 [67] is the latest version
of the YOLO series. To solve the trade-off problem between
speed and accuracy, Liu et al. proposed SSD [62] in 2015,
which introduces the regression technologies for object de-
tection. Then, RetinaNet was proposed in 2017 [68] to further
improve detection accuracy by introducing a new loss function
to reshape the standard cross-entropy loss.
2) Lane detection: Performing accurate lane detection in
real-time is a crucial function of advanced driver-assistance
systems (ADAS) [10], since it enables AVs to drive themselves
within the road lanes correctly to avoid collisions, and it
supports the subsequent trajectory planning decision and lane
departure.
Traditional lane detection approaches (e.g. [69], [70], [71],
[72], [73], [74]) aims to detect lane segments based on diverse
handcrafted cues, such as color-based features [75], the struc-
ture tensor [76], the bar filter [77], and ridge features [78]. This
information is usually combined with a Hough transform [79],
[80] and particle or Kalman filters [81], [82], [77] to detect
lane markings. Then, post-processing methods are leveraged
to filter out misdetections and classify lane points to output the
final lane detection results [83]. However, in general, they are
prone to effectiveness issues due to the road scene variations,
e.g., changing from city scene to highway scene and hard
to achieve a reasonable accuracy under challenging scenarios
without a visual clue.
Recently, deep learning-based segmentation approaches
have dominated the lane detection field with more accurate
performance [84]. For instance, VPGNet [85] proposes a
multi-task network for lane marking detection. To better utilize
visual information more of lane markings, SCNN [86] applies
a novel convolution operation that aggregates diverse dimen-
sion information via processing sliced features and then adds
them together. In order to accelerate the detection speed, light-
weight DNNs have been proposed for real-time applications.
6For example, self-attention distillation (SAD) [24] adopts an
attention distillation mechanism. Besides, other methods such
as Sequential prediction and clustering are also introduced.
In [87], a long short-term memory (LSTM) network is pre-
sented to face the lane’s long line structure issue. Similarly,
Fast-Draw [88] predicts the lane’s direction at the pixel-wise
level. In [89], the problem of lane detection is defined as a
binary clustering problem. The method proposed in [90] also
uses a clustering approach for lane detection. Later on, a 3D
form of lane detection [91] is introduced to face the non-
flatten ground issue.
3) Localization and mapping: Localization and mapping
are fundamental to autonomous driving. Localization is re-
sponsible for finding ego-position relative to a map [92]. The
mapping constructs multi-layer high definition (HD) maps [93]
for path planning. Therefore, the accuracy of localization and
mapping affects the feasibility and safety of path planning.
Currently, GPS-IMU based localization methods have been
widely utilized in navigation software like Google Maps.
However, the accuracy required for urban automated driving
can’t be fulfilled by GPS-IMU systems [94].
Currently, systems that use a pre-build HD map are more
practical and accurate. There are three main types of HD
maps: landmark-based, point cloud-based, vision-based. Land-
marks such as poles, curbs, signs, and road markers can
be detected with LiDAR [95] or camera [96]. Landmark
searching consumes less computation than the point cloud-
based approach but fails in scenarios where landmarks are
insufficient. The point cloud contains detailed information
about the environment with thousands of points from Li-
DAR [97] or camera [98]. Iterative closest point (ICP) [99]
and normal distributions transform (NDT) [100] are two
algorithms used in point cloud-based HD map generation.
They utilize numerical optimization algorithms to calculate
the best match. ICP iteratively selects the closest point to
calculate the best match. On the other side, NDT represents
the map as a combination of the normal distribution, then use
the maximum likelihood estimation equation to search match.
NDT’s computation complexity is less than ICP [101], but it
was not as robust as ICP. Vision-based HD maps are another
direction recently becoming more and more popular. The
computational overhead limits its application in real systems.
Several methods for matching maps with the 2D camera as
well as matching 2D image to the 3D image are proposed for
mapping [102], [103], [104].
In contrast, simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM)
[105] is proposed to build the map and localize the vehicle si-
multaneously. SLAM can be divided into LiDAR-based SLAM
and camera-based SLAM. Among LiDAR-based SLAM al-
gorithms, LOAM [106] can be finished in real-time. IMLS-
SLAM [107] focuses on reducing accumulated drift by uti-
lizing a scan-to-model matching method. Cartographer [108],
a SLAM package from Google, improves performance by
using sub-map and loop closure while supporting both 2D and
3D LiDAR. Compared with LiDAR-based SLAM, camera-
based SLAM approaches use frame-to-frame matching. There
are two types of matching methods, feature-based and direct
matching. Feature-based methods [109], [110], [111] extract
features and track them to calculate the motion of the camera.
Since features are sparse in the image, feature-based methods
are also called sparse visual SLAM. Direct matching [112],
[113], [114] is called dense visual SLAM, which adopts
original information for matching that is dense in the image,
such as color and depth from an RGB-D camera. The inherent
properties of feature-based methods lead to its faster speed
but bring the failure in texture-less environments as well.
The dense SLAM solves the issues of the sparse SLAM
with higher computation complexity. For situations that are
lack of computation resources, semiDense [115], [116] SLAM
methods that only use direct methods are proposed. Besides
the above methods, deep learning methods are also utilized in
solving feature extraction [117], motion estimation [118], and
long-term localization [119].
4) Prediction and planning: The prediction module eval-
uates the driving behaviors of the surrounding vehicles and
pedestrians for risk assessment [25]. Hidden Markov model
(HMM) has been used to predict the target vehicle’s future
behavior and detect unsafe lane change events [120], [121].
Planning means finding feasible routes on the map from
origin to the destination. GPS navigation systems are known
as global planners [122] to plan a feasible global route,
but it does not guarantee safety. In this context, the local
planner is developed [123], which can be divided into three
groups: (1) Graph-based planners that give the best path to
the destination. (2) Sampling-based planners which randomly
scan the environments and only find a feasible path. (3)
Interpolating curve planners that are proposed to smooth
the path. A* [124] is a heuristic implementation of Dijkstra
that always preferentially searches the path from the origin
to the destination, without considering the vehicle’s motion
control, which causes the planning generated by A* cannot
always be executed by the vehicle. To remedy this problem,
hybrid A* [125] generates a drivable curve between each
node instead of a jerky line. Sampling-based planners [126]
randomly select nodes for search in the graph, reducing the
searching time. Among them, Rapidly-exploring Random Tree
(RRT) [127] is the most commonly used method for automated
vehicles. As an extension of RRT, RRT* [128], [129] tries
to search the optimal paths satisfying real-time constraints.
How to balance the sampling size and computation efficiency
is a big challenge for sampling-based planners. Graph-based
planners and sampling-based planners can achieve optimal
or sub-optimal with jerky paths that can be smoothed with
interpolating curve planners.
5) Vehicle control: Vehicle control connects autonomous
driving computing systems and the drive-by-wire system. It
adjusts the steering angle and maintains the desired speed
to follow the planning module’s trajectories. Typically, ve-
hicle control is accomplished using two controllers: lateral
controller and longitudinal controller. Controllers must handle
rough and curvy roads, and quickly varying types, such as
gravel, loose sand, and mud puddles [130], which are not
considered by vehicle planners. The output commands are
calculated from the vehicle state and the trajectory by control
law. There are various control laws, such as fuzzy control
[131], [132], PID control [133], [134], Stanley control [130]
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control creates outputs based on proportional, integral, and
derivative teams of inputs. Fuzzy control accepts continuous
values between 0 and 1 instead of either 1 or 0 as the
inputs continuously respond. Stanley control is utilized to
follow the reference path by minimizing the heading angle
and cross-track error using a nonlinear control law. MPC
performs a finite horizon optimization to identify the control
command. Since it can handle various constraints and use past
and current errors to predict more accurate solutions, MPC
has been used to solve hard control problems like following
overtaking trajectories [138]. Controllers derive control laws
depending on the vehicle model. Kinematic bicycle models
and dynamic bicycle models are most commonly used. In
[139], a comparison is present to determine which of these
two models is more suitable for MPC in forecast error and
computational overhead.
D. Computation Hardware
To support real-time data processing from various sensors,
powerful computing hardware is essential to autonomous ve-
hicles’ safety. Currently, plenty of computing hardware with
different design shows up on the automobile and computing
market. In this section, we will show several representative
designs based on Graphic Processor Unit (GPU), Digital
Signal Processor (DSP), Field Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGA), and Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC).
NVIDIA DRIVE AGX is the newest solution from NVIDIA
unveiled on CES 2018 [33]. AGX is the worlds most powerful
System-on-Chip (SoC), and it’s ten times more powerful
than the NVIDIA Drive PX2 platform. Each DRIVE AGX
consists of two Xavier cores. Each Xavier has a custom 8-
core CPU and a 512-core Volta GPU. DRIVE AGX is capable
of 320 trillion operations per second (TOPS) of processing
performance.
Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC is an automotive-grade product
from Xilinx [140]. It’s an FPGA-based device designed for au-
tonomous driving. It includes 64-bit quad-core ARM Cortex-
A53 and dual-core ARM Cortex-R5. This scalable solution
claims to deliver the right performance/watt with safety and
security [141].
Texas Instruments TDA provides a DSP-based solution for
autonomous driving. A TDA3x SoC consists of two C66x
Floating-Point VLIW DSP cores with vision AccelerationPac.
Besides, each TDA3x SoC has dual Arm Cortex-M4 image
processors. The vision accelerator is designed to accelerate the
process functions on images. Compared with an ARM Cortex-
15 CPU, TDA3x SoC provides an eight-fold acceleration on
computer vision tasks with less power consumption [142].
MobileEye EyeQ5 is the leading ASIC-based solution to
support fully-autonomous (Level 5) vehicles [143]. EyeQ5 is
designed based on 7nm-FinFET semiconductor technology,
and it provides 24Tops computation capability with 10 Watts’
power budget. TPU is Google’s AI accelerator ASIC mainly
for neural network and machine learning [144]. TPU v3 is the
newest release, which provides 420 teraflops computation for
a single board.
E. Storage
The data captured by an autonomous vehicle is proliferating,
typically generating between 20TB and 40TB per day, per
vehicle [145]. The data includes cameras (20 to 40MB), as
well as sonar (10 to 100KB), radar (10 to 100KB), and
LiDAR (10 to 70MB) [146], [147]. Storing data securely
and efficiently can accelerate overall system performance.
Take object detection as an example: the history data could
contribute to the improvement of detection precision using
machine learning algorithms. Map generation can also benefit
from the stored data in updating traffic and road conditions
appropriately. Besides, the sensor data can be utilized to ensure
public safety and predict and prevent crime. The biggest
challenge is to ensure that sensors collect the right data, and
it is processed immediately, stored securely, and transferred
to other technologies in the chain, such as Road-Side Unit
(RSU), cloud data center, and even third-party users [148].
More importantly, creating hierarchical storage and workflow
that enables smooth data accessing and computing is still
an open question for the future development of autonomous
vehicles.
In [149], a computational storage system called HydraSpace
is proposed to tackle the storage issue for autonomous driving
vehicles. HydraSpace is designed with multi-layered storage
architecture and practical compression algorithms to manage
the sensor pipe data. OpenVDAP is a full-stack edge-based
data analytic platform for connected and autonomous vehicles
(CAVs) [148]. It envisions the future four types of CAVs
applications, including autonomous driving, in-vehicle info-
tainment, real-time diagnostics, and third-party applications
like traffic information collector and SafeShareRide [150].
The hierarchical design of the storage system called driving
data integrator (DDI) is proposed in OpenVDAP to provide
sensor-aware and application-aware data storage and process-
ing [148].
F. Real-Time Operating Systems
According to the automation level definitions from the
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) [151], the automation
of vehicles increases from level 2 to level 5, and the level
5 requires full automation of the vehicle, which means the
vehicle can drive under any environment without the help
from the human. To make the vehicle run in a safe mode,
how to precept the environment and make decisions in real-
time becomes a big challenge. That’s why real-time operating
system becomes a hot topic in the design and implementation
of autonomous driving systems.
RTOS is widely used in the embedded system of ECUs to
control the vehicle’s throttle, brake, etc. QNX and VxWorks
are two representative commercialized RTOS widely used in
the automotive industry. The QNX kernel contains only CPU
scheduling, inter-process communication, interrupt redirection,
and timers. Everything else runs as a user process, including
a unique process known as “proc”, which performs process
creation and memory management by operating in conjunction
with the microkernel [152]. VxWorks is designed for embedded
systems requiring real-time, deterministic performance and, in
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supports multiple architectures, including Intel, POWER, and
ARM. VxWorks also uses real-time kernels for mission-critical
applications subject to real-time constraints, which guarantees
a response within pre-defined time constraints.
RTLinux is a microkernel-based operating system that sup-
ports hard real-time [154]. The scheduler of RTLinux allows
full preemption. Compared with using a low-preempt patch
in Linux, RTLinux allows preemption for the whole Linux
system. RTLinux makes it possible to run real-time critical
tasks and interprets them together with the Linux [155].
NVIDIA DRIVE OS is a foundational software stack from
NVIDIA, which consists of an embedded RTOS, hypervisor,
NVIDIA CUDA libraries, NVIDIA Tensor RT, etc. that needed
for the acceleration of machine learning algorithms [156].
G. Middleware Systems
Robotic systems, such as autonomous vehicle systems,
often involve multiple services, with many dependencies. A
middleware is required to facilitate communications between
different autonomous driving services.
Most existing autonomous driving solutions utilize the
Robot Operating System (ROS) [27]. Specifically, ROS is a
communication middleware that facilitates communications
between different modules of an autonomous vehicle system.
ROS supports four communication methods: topic, service,
action, and parameter. ROS2 is a promising middleware de-
veloped to make communications more efficient, reliable, and
secure [157]. However, currently, most of the packages and
tools for sensor data process are still based on ROS.
The Autoware Foundation is a non-profit organization
supporting open-source projects enabling self-driving mo-
bility [158]. Autoware.AI is developed based on ROS, and
it’s the world’s first ”All-in-One” open-source software for
autonomous driving technology. Apollo Cyber [159] is another
open-source middleware developed by Baidu. Apollo aims
to accelerate the development, testing, and deployment of
autonomous vehicles. Apollo Cyber is a high-performance run-
time framework that is greatly optimized for high concurrency,
low latency, and high throughput in autonomous driving.
In traditional automobile society, the runtime envi-
ronment layer in Automotive Open System Architec-
ture(AutoSAR) [160] can be seen as middleware. Many compa-
nies develop their middleware to support AutoSAR. However,
there are few independent open-source middlewares nowadays
because it is a commercial vehicle company’s core technology.
Auto companies prefer to provide middleware as a component
of a complete set of autonomous driving solutions.
H. V2X Communication
In addition to obtaining information from the on-board sen-
sors, the recent proliferation in communication mechanisms,
e.g., DSRC, C-V2X, and 5G, has enabled the autonomous
driving vehicles to obtain information from other vehicles, in-
frastructures like traffic lights and RSU, as well as pedestrians.
1) LTE/4G/5G: Long-Term Evolution (LTE) is a transi-
tional product in the transition from 3G to 4G [161], which
provides downlink peak rates of 300 Mbit/s, uplink peak rates
of 75 Mbit/s. The fourth-generation communications (4G)
comply with 1 Gbit/s for stationary reception and 100 Mbit/s
for mobile. As the next-generation mobile communication, the
fastest U.S. users experienced average 5G download speed
reached 494.7 Mbps on Verizon, 17.7 times faster than that
of 4G. And from Version’s early report, the latency of 5G
is less than 30 ms, 23 ms faster than average 4G metrics.
However, we cannot deny that 5G still has the following
challenges: complex system, high costs, and poor obstacle
avoidance capabilities.
2) DSRC: Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC)
[162] is a type of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication
protocol, which is specially designed for connected vehicles.
DSRC is based on the IEEE 802.11p standard, and its working
frequency is 5.9GHz. Fifteen message types are defined in
the SAE J2735 standard [163], which covers information like
the vehicle’s position, map information, emergence warning,
etc. [162]. Limited by the available bandwidth, DSRC mes-
sages have small size and low frequency. However, DSRC
provides reliable communication, even when the vehicle is
driving 120 miles per hour.
3) C-V2X: Cellular vehicle-to-everything (C-V2X) com-
bines the traditional V2X network with the cellular network,
which delivers mature network assistance and commercial
services of 4G/5G into autonomous driving. Like DSRC, the
working frequency of C-V2X is also the primary common
spectrum, 5.9 GHz [164]. Different from the CSMA-CA in
DSRC, C-V2X has no contention overheads by using semi-
persistent transmission with relative energy-based selection.
Besides, the performance of C-V2X can be seamlessly im-
proved with the upgrade of the cellular network. Generally,
C-V2X is more suitable for V2X scenarios where cellular
networks are widely deployed.
I. Security and Privacy
With the increasing degree of vehicle electronification and
the reliance on a wide variety of technologies, such as sensing
and machine learning, the security of AVs has risen from
the hardware damage of traditional vehicles to comprehensive
security with multi-domain knowledge. Here, we introduce
several security problems strongly associated with AVs with
the current attacking methods and standard coping methods.
In addition to the security and privacy issues mentioned as
follows, AVs systems should also take care of many other
security issues in other domains, such as patching vulnerabil-
ities of hardware or software systems and detecting intrusions
[165].
1) Sensing security: As the eye of autonomous vehicles,
the security of sensors is nearly essential. Typically, jamming
attacks and spoofing attacks are two primary attacks for
various sensors [166], [167]. For example, the spoofing attack
generates an interference signal, resulting in a fake obstacle
captured by the vehicle [168]. Besides, GPS also encounters
spoofed attacks [169]. Therefore, protection mechanisms are
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dant sensors are usually used by these signal-reflection sensors
[170], [171], including LiDAR and radar. The GPS can check
signal characteristics [172] and authenticate data sources [173]
to prevent attacks. Also, sensing data fusion is an effective
mechanism.
2) Communication security: Communication security in-
cludes two aspects: internal communication and outside com-
munication. Currently, internal communication like CAN, LIN,
and FlexRay, has faced severe security threats [174], [175],
[176]. The cryptography is frequently-used technology to keep
the transmitted data confidential, integrated, and authenticated
[177]. However, the usage of cryptography is limited by the
high computational cost for these resource-constrained ECUs.
Therefore, another attempt is to use the gateway to prevent
unallowed access [178]. The outside communication has been
studied in VANETs with V2V, V2R, and V2X communications
[179], [180], [181]. Cryptography is the primary tool. A trusted
key distribution and management is built in most approaches,
and vehicles use assigned keys to authenticate vehicles and
data.
3) Data security: Data security refers to preventing data
leakage from the perspectives of transmission and storage. The
former has been discussed in communication security, where
various cryptography approaches are proposed to protect data
in different scenarios [182], [183]. The cryptography is also
a significant technology of securing data storage, such as
an encrypted database [184] and file system [185]. Besides,
access control technology [186] protects stored data from
another view, wide-used in modern operating systems. An
access control framework [187] has been proposed for AVs
to protect in-vehicle data in real-time data and historical data,
with different access control models.
4) Control security: With vehicles’ electronification, users
could open the door through an electronic key and control their
vehicles through an application or voice. However, this also
leads to new attack surfaces with various attack methods, such
as jamming attacks, replay attacks, relay attacks, etc. [166].
For example, the attacker could capture the communication
between key and door and replay it to open the door [188].
Also, for those voice control supported vehicles, the attackers
could successfully control the vehicle by the voices that
humans cannot hear [189]. Parts of these attacks could be clas-
sified into sensing security, communication security, or data
security, which can be addressed by corresponding protection
mechanisms.
5) Privacy: An attacker can learn user privacy from ana-
lyzing user data. For example, by analyzing vehicle control
data, the driver identity can be recognized [190]. Thus, the
most straightforward but hard protection is to prevent data
from being obtained by an attacker, such as access control and
data encryption. Another way is data desensitization, including
anonymization and differential privacy [191].
V. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
From the review of the current key technologies of the
computing system for autonomous driving, we can find that
there are still many challenges and open issues for the research
and development of L4 or L5 autonomous driving vehicles.
In this section, we summarize ten remaining challenges and
discuss the opportunities with our visions for autonomous
driving.
A. Multi-sensors Data Synchronization
Data on the autonomous driving vehicle has various sources:
its sensors, other vehicle sensors, RSU, and even social media.
One big challenge to handle a variety of data sources is how
to synchronize them.
For example, a camera usually produces 30-60 frames per
second, while LiDAR’s point cloud data frequency is 10HZ.
For applications like 3D object detection, which requires
camera frames and point cloud at the same time, should
the storage system do synchronization beforehand or let
the application developer do it? This issue becomes more
challenging, considering that the timestamps’ accuracy from
different sensors falls into different granularities. For example,
considering the vehicles that use network time protocol (NTP)
for time synchronization, the timestamp difference can be as
long as 100ms [192], [193]. For some sensors with a built-
in GNSS antenna, the time accuracy goes to the nanosecond
level. In contrast, other sensors get a timestamp from the host
machine system time when accuracy is at the millisecond level.
Since the accuracy of the time synchronization is expected to
affect the vehicle control’s safety, handling the sensor data
with different frequency and timestamp accuracy is still an
open question.
B. Failure Detection and Diagnostics
Today’s AVs are equipped with multiple sensors, including
LiDARs, radars, and GPS [194]. Although we can take ad-
vantage of these sensors in terms of providing a robust and
complete description of the surrounding area, some open prob-
lems related to the failure detection are waiting to be solved.
Here, we list and discuss four failure detection challenges:
(1) Definition of sensor failure: there is even no standard,
agreed-upon universal definition or standards to define the
scenario of sensor failures [195]. However, we must propose
and categorize the standard of sensor failures to support failure
detection by applying proper methods. (2) Sensor failure: more
importantly, there is no comprehensive and reliable study on
sensor failure detection, which would be extremely dangerous
since most of the self-driving applications are relying on the
data produced by these sensors [196]. If some sensors en-
countered a failure, collisions and environmental catastrophes
might happen. (3) Sensor data failure: in the real application
scenario, even the sensor themselves are working correctly,
the generated data may still not reflect the actual scenario and
report the wrong information to people [197]. For instance, the
camera is blocked by unknown objects such as leaves or mud,
or the radar deviates from its original fixed position due to
wind force. In this context, sensor data failure detection is very
challenging, (4) Algorithm failure: In the challenge scenarios
with severe occlusion and extreme lighting conditions, such as
night, rainy days, and snowy days, deploying and executing
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state-of-the-art algorithms cannot guarantee output the ideal
results [198]. For example, lane markings are usually failed
to be detected at nights by the algorithms that are hard
to explicitly utilize the prior information like rigidity and
smoothness of lanes [199]. However, humans can easily infer
their positions and fill in the occluded part of the context.
Therefore, how to develop advanced algorithms to further
improve detection accuracy is still a big challenge.
For a complex system with rich sensors and hardware
devices, failures could happen everywhere. How to tackle
the failure and diagnose the issue becomes a big issue. One
example is the diagnose of lane controller systems from
Google [200]. The idea is to determine the root cause of mal-
functions based on comparing the actual steering corrections
applied to those predicted by the virtual dynamics module.
C. How to Deal with Normal-Abnormal?
Normal-abnormal represents the normal scenarios in daily
life, but it’s abnormal in the autonomous driving dataset.
Typically, there are three cases of normal-abnormal: adverse
weather, emergency maneuvers, and work zone.
1) Adverse weather: One of the most critical issues in the
development of AVs is the poor performance under adverse
weather conditions, such as rain, snow, fog, and hail, be-
cause the equipped sensors (e.g., LiDAR, radar, camera, and
GPS) might be significantly affected by the extreme weather.
The work of [201] characterized the effect of rainfall on
millimeter-wave (mm-wave) radar and proved that under heavy
rainfall conditions, the detection range of millimeter-wave
radar can be reduced by as much as 45%. Filgueira et al. [202]
pointed out that as the rain intensity increases, the detected
LiDAR intensity will attenuate. At the same time, Bernardin et
al. [203] proposed a methodology to quantitatively estimate the
loss of visual performance due to rainfall. Most importantly,
experimental results show that, compared to training in narrow
cases and scenarios, using various data sets to train object
detection networks may not necessarily improve the perfor-
mance of these networks. [204]. However, there is currently
no research to provide a systematic and unified method to
reduce the impact of weather on various sensors used in AVs.
Therefore, there is an urgent need for novel deep learning
networks that have sufficient capabilities to cope with safe
autonomous driving under severe weather conditions.
2) Emergency maneuvers: In emergency situations, such
as a road collapse, braking failure, a tire blowout, or suddenly
seeing a previously “invisible” pedestrian, the maneuvering
of the AVs may need to reach its operating limit to avoid
collisions. However, these collision avoidance actions usually
conflict with stabilization actions aimed at preventing the
vehicle from losing control, and in the end, they may cause
collision accidents. In this context, some research has been
done to guarantee safe driving for AVs in emergent situa-
tions. For example, Hilgert et al. proposed a path planning
method for emergency maneuvers based on elastic bands
[205]. [206] is proposed to determine the minimum distance
at which obstacles cannot be avoided at a given speed. Guo
et al. [207] discussed dynamic control design for automated
driving, with particular emphasis on coordinated steering and
braking control in emergency avoidance. Nevertheless, how
an autonomous vehicle safely responds to different classes of
emergencies with on-board sensors is still an open problem.
3) Work zone: Work zone recognition is another challenge
for an autonomous driving system to overcome. For most
drivers, the work zone means congestion and delay of the
driving plan. Many projects have been launched to reduce
and eliminate work zone injuries and deaths for construction
workers and motorists. ”Workzonesafety.org” summarizes re-
cent years of work zone crashes and supplies training programs
to increase public awareness of the importance of work-zone
safety. Seo [208] proposed a machine learning-based method
to improve the recognition of work zone signs. Developers
from Kratos Defense & Security Solutions [209] present an
autonomous truck which safely passes a work zone. Their
system relied on V2V communications to connect the self-
driving vehicle with a leader vehicle. The self-driving vehicle
accepted navigation data from the leader vehicle to travel
along its route while kept a pre-defined distance. Until now,
the work zone is still a threat to drivers and workers’ safety
but hasn’t attracted too much attention to autonomous driving
researchers. There are still significant gaps in this research
field, waiting for researchers to explore and tackle critical
problems.
D. Cyberattack Protection
Attacks and defenses are always opposites, and absolute
security does not exist. The emerging CAVs face many security
challenges, such as reply attacks to simulate a vehicle’s
electronic key and spoof attacks to make vehicle detour
[188], [166]. With the integration of new sensors, devices,
technologies, infrastructures, applications, the attack surface
of CAVs is further expanded.
Many attacks aim to one part of the CAVs system and
could be protected by the method of fusing several other
views. For example, a cheated roadblock detected by radars
could be corrected by camera data. Thus, how to build such a
system to protect CAVs, systematically, is the first challenge
for the CAVs system. The protection system is expected to
detect potential attacks, evaluate the system security status,
and recover from attacks.
Besides, some novel attack methods should be attended.
Recently, some attacks have been proposed to trick these
algorithms [210]. For example, a photo instead of a human
to pass the face recognition or a note-sized photo posted on
the forehead makes machine learning algorithms fail to detect
faces [211]. Thus, how to defend the attacks on machine
learning algorithms is a challenge for CAVs systems.
Furthermore, some new technologies could be used to en-
hance the security of the CAVs system. With the development
of quantum computing technology, the existing cryptography
standards cannot ensure protected data, communication, and
systems. Thus, designing post-quantum cryptography [212]
and architecture is a promising topic for CAVs and infras-
tructure in ITS.
Also, we notice that the hardware-assistant trusted execution
environment [213] could improve the system security, which
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provides an isolated and trusted execution environment (TEE)
for applications. However, it has limited physical memory
size, and execution performance will drop sharply as the total
memory usage increases. Therefore, how to split the system
components and make critical parts in the TEE with high
security is still a challenge in design and implementation.
E. Vehicle Operating System
The vehicle operating system is expected to abstracts the
hardware resources for higher layer middleware and au-
tonomous driving applications. In the vehicle operating system
development, one of the biggest challenges is the compatibility
with the vehicle’s embedded system. Take Autoware as an
example: although it is a full-stack solution of the vehicle oper-
ating system which provides a rich set of self-driving modules
composed of sensing, computing, and actuation capabilities,
the usage of it is still limited to several commercial vehicles
with a small set of supportable sensors [214]. On a modern
automobile, as many as 70 electronic control units (ECU) are
installed for various subsystems, and they are communicated
via CAN bus. For the sake of system security and commercial
interests, most of the vehicles’ CAN protocol is not open-
sourced, which is the main obstacle for developing a unified
vehicle operating system.
AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture) is
a standardization initiative of leading automotive manufac-
turers and suppliers founded in the autumn of 2003 [160].
AUTOSAR is promising in narrowing the gap for developing
an open-source vehicle operating system. However, most au-
tomobile companies are relatively conservative to open-source
their vehicle operating systems, restricting the availability of
AUTOSAR to the general research and education community.
There is still a strong demand for a robust, open-source vehicle
operating system for AVs.
F. Energy Consumption
With rich sensors and powerful computing devices imple-
mented on the vehicle, energy consumption becomes a big
issue. Take the NVIDIA Drive PX Pegasus as an example: it
consumes 320 INT8 TOPS of AI computational power with
a 500 Watts budget. If we added the external devices like
sensors, communication antennas, storage, battery, etc., the
total energy consumption would be larger than 1000W [33].
Besides, if a duplicate system is installed for the autonomous
driving applications’ reliability, the total power dissipation
could go up to almost 2000W.
How to handle such a tremendous amount of power dis-
sipation is not only a problem for the battery management
system; it is also a problem for the heat dissipation system.
What makes this issue more severe is the size limitation and
auto-grid requirements from the vehicle’s perspective. How
to make the computing system of the autonomous driving
vehicle become energy efficient is still an open challenge.
E2M tackles this problem by proposed as an energy-efficient
middleware for the management and scheduling deep learning
applications to save energy for the computing device [37].
However, according to the profiling results, most of the energy
is consumed by vehicles’ motors. Energy-efficient autonomous
driving requires the co-design in battery cells, energy manage-
ment systems, and autonomous vehicle computing systems.
G. Cost
In the United States, the average cost to build a traditional
non-luxury vehicle is roughly $30,000, and for an AV, the total
cost is around $250,000 [215]. AVs need an abundance of
hardware equipment to support their normal functions. These
additional hardware equipments required for AVs include
but are not limited to the communication device, computing
equipment, drive-by-wire system, extra power supply, various
sensors, cameras, LiDAR, and radar. In addition, to ensure
AV’s reliability and safety, a backup of these hardware devices
may be necessary [216]. For example, if the main battery fails,
the vehicle should have a backup power source to support
computing systems to move the vehicle.
The cost of building an autonomous vehicle is already
very high, not to mention the maintenance cost of an AV,
e.g., diagnostics, repair, etc. High maintenance cost leads
to declining consumer demand and undesirable profitability
for the vehicle manufacturers. Companies like Ford and GM
have already cut their low-profit production lines to save the
cost [217], [218].
Indeed, the cost of computing systems for AVs currently in
the research and development stage is very high. However,
we hope that with the maturity of the technologies and
the emergence of some alternative solutions, the price will
ultimately drop to a level that individuals can afford. Take
battery packs of the electric vehicles (EVs) as an example:
when the first mass-market EVs were introduced in 2010, their
battery packs were estimated at the US $1,000 per kilowatt-
hour (kWh). However, Teslas Model 3 battery pack costs $190
per kilowatt-hour, and General Motors 2017 Chevrolet Bolt
battery pack is estimated to cost $205 per kilowatt-hour. In 6
years, the price per kilowatt-hour has dropped by more than
70% [219]. Also, Waymo claims to have successfully reduced
the experimental version of high-end LiDAR to approximately
$7,500. Besides, Tesla, which uses only radar instead of
LIDAR, says its autonomous vehicle equipment is around
$8,000 [215]. In addition to the reduction of hardware costs,
we believe that the optimization of computing software in an
AV can also help reduce the cost to a great extent.
H. How to Benefit from Smart Infrastructure?
Smart infrastructure combines sensors, computing plat-
forms, and communication devices with the physical traffic
infrastructure [220]. It is expected to enable the AVs to achieve
a more efficient and reliable perception and decision making.
Typically, AVs could benefit from smart infrastructure in three
aspects: (1) Service provider Its struggling for an AV to find
a parking space in the parking lot. By deploying sensors
like RFID on the smart infrastructure, the parking services
can be handled quickly [221]. As the infrastructure becomes
a provider for parking service, it is possible to schedule
service requests to achieve the maximum usage. Meanwhile,
AVs can reduce the time and computation for searching
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services. (2) Traffic information sharing: Traffic information
is essential to safe driving. Lack of traffic information causes
traffic congestion or even accidents. Roadside Units (RSUs) is
implemented to provide traffic information to passing vehicles
through V2X communications. Besides, RSUs are also used
to surveillance road situations using various on-board sensors
like cameras and LiDARs [222]. The collected data is used
for various tasks, including weather warning, map updating,
road events detection, and making up blind spots of AVs. (3)
Task offloading: Various algorithms are running on the vehicle
for safe driving. Handling all workloads in real-time requires
a tremendous amount of computation and power, infeasible
on a battery-powered vehicle [223]. Therefore, offloading
heavy computation workloads to the infrastructure is proposed
to accelerate the computation and save energy. However,
to perform a feasible offloading, the offloading framework
must offload computations to the infrastructure while ensuring
timing predictability [224]. Therefore, how to schedule the
order of offloading workloads is still a challenge to benefit
from the smart infrastructure.
I. Dealing with Human Drivers
According to NHTSA data collected from all 50 states and
the District of Columbia, 37,461 lives were lost on U.S. roads
in 2016, and 94% of crashes were associated with a human
choice or error [225]. Although autonomous driving is pro-
posed to replace human drivers with computers/machines for
safety purposes, human driving vehicles will never disappear.
How to enable computers/machines in AVs to interact with a
human driver becomes a big challenge.
Compared with a human driver, machines are generally
more suited for tasks like vehicle control and multi-sensor data
processing. In contrast, the human driver maintains an advan-
tage in perception and sensing the environment [226]. One
of the fundamental reasons is that the machine cannot think
like a human. Current machine learning-based approaches
cannot handle situations that are not captured in the training
dataset. For example, in driving automation from SAE, one
of the critical differences between level 2 and level 3/4/5 is
whether the vehicle can make decisions like overtaking or lane
changing by itself [227]. In some instances, interacting with
other human drivers becomes a big challenge because human
drivers can make mistakes or violate traffic rules.
Many works focus on getting a more accurate speed and
control predictions of the surrounding vehicles to handle the
machine-human interaction [228], [120]. Deep reinforcement
learning shows promising performance in complex scenarios
requiring interaction with other vehicles [87], [23]. However,
they are either simulation-based or demonstration in limited
scenarios. Another promising direction to tackle machine-
human interaction is through V2X communications. Compared
with predicting other vehicles’ behavior, it’s more accurate to
communicate safety information [229].
J. Experimental Platform
The deployment of autonomous driving algorithms or proto-
types requires complex tests and evaluations in a real environ-
ment, which makes the experimental platform becomes one
of the fundamental parts of conducting research and devel-
opment. However, building and maintaining an autonomous
driving vehicle is enormous: the cost of a real autonomous
driving could attain $250,000; maintaining the vehicle requires
parking, insurance, and auto maintenance. Let alone the laws
and regulations to consider for field testing.
Given these limitations and problems, lots of autonomous
driving simulators and open-source prototypes are proposed
for research and development purposes. dSPACE provides an
end-to-end simulation environment for sensor data processing
and scenario-based testing with RTMaps and VEOS [230].
The automated driving toolbox is Simulink’s software, which
provides algorithms and tools for designing, simulating, and
testing ADAS and autonomous driving systems [231]. In
addition to these commercialized products, there are also open-
source projects like CARLA and Gezabo for urban driving or
robotics simulations [232], [233].
Another promising direction is to develop affordable re-
search and development of autonomous driving platforms.
Several experiment platforms are quite successful for indoor or
low-speed scenarios. HydraOne is an open-source experimen-
tal platform for indoor autonomous driving, and it provides
full-stack programmability for autonomous driving algorithms
developers and system developers [234]. DragonFly is another
example that supports self-driving with a speed of fewer than
40 miles per hour and a price of less than $40,000 [235].
K. Physical Worlds Coupling
Autonomous driving is a typical cyber-physical sys-
tem [236], where the computing systems and the physical
world have to work closely and smoothly. With a human
driver, the feeling of a driver is easily coupled with the
vehicle control actions. For example, if the driver doesn’t like
the abrupt stop, he or she can step the brake gradually. In
autonomous driving, the control algorithm will determine the
speed of braking and accelerating. We envision that different
human feeling, coupled with complex traffic environment,
bring an unprecedented challenge to the vehicle control in
autonomous driving. Take the turning left as an example: how
fast should the drive-by-wire system turn 90 degrees? An ideal
vehicle control algorithm of turning left should consider many
factors, such as the friction of road surface, vehicle’s current
speed, weather conditions, and the movement range, as well
as human comfortableness, if possible. Cross-layer design and
optimization among perception, control, vehicle dynamics, and
drive-by-wire systems might be a promising direction [237].
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent proliferation of computing and communica-
tion technologies like machine learning, hardware acceler-
ation, DSRC, C-V2X, and 5G has dramatically promoted
autonomous driving vehicles. Complex computing systems
are designed to leverage the sensors and computation devices
to understand the traffic environments correctly in real-time.
However, the early developed autonomous vehicles’ fatalities
arise from time to time, which reveals the big gap between
the current computing system with the expected robust system
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for level-4/level-5 full autonomous driving. In this paper, we
present the state-of-the-art computing systems for autonomous
driving, including seven performance metrics, nine key tech-
nologies, and eleven challenges and opportunities to realize
the vision of autonomous driving. We hope this paper will
bring these challenges to the attention of both the computing
and automotive communities.
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